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The Relevance of Slavery: Race and
The American Legal Process*
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.**
Introduction
To participate in the Notre Dame Civil Rights Lecture Series is the highest
of honors. Your lecturers in the past have been among our most distinguished
and thoughtful jurists, scholars and civil rights practitioners. Like all who have
preceded me, not for reasons of protocol but because it is so true, I must first
note my unlimited esteem for Father Theodore M. Hesburgh's long and enduring
contributions to the advancement of human rights throughout this nation and
the world. At all times during these dramatic and tension-filled struggles, he has
been one of the nation's wisest and most effective leaders. If, during the last
twenty-five years, most college presidents, public officials, and leaders of business
and labor had demonstrated his understanding of and commitment to solving
these problems, we would not be confronted today with the magnitude of press-
ing civil rights problems which still exist and we would be far closer to the fru-
ition of Martin Luther King's dream that someday we would "transform the
jangling discords of our nation into a beautiful symphony of brotherhood."1
As I surveyed the moving lectures previously presented in this series, the
common denominator was always a commitment to full equality of opportunity
and a recognition that opportunity must be measured by actual results rather
than theoretical options. I agree with those pronouncements, yet I am increas-
ingly convinced that the cause of human rights will not be advanced by merely
repeating admonitions which others have made so eloquently that as individuals,
as institutions, and as a nation we should and must do better.
I. The Relevance of Slavery
Instead of initially focusing on the civil rights crisis of the hour or even of
this decade, I will comment primarily on an evil institution of centuries ago and
ask you: Can we obtain insights for today's problems if we know more about
* Some of the themes in this article have been developed more extensively in L. IGoIN-
BOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS, THE
COLONIAL PERIOD (1978). Copyright @ 1978 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Reprinted by
permission.
** A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. is a graduate of Yale Law School and holds sixteen honorary
degrees. He has taught at Yale University, the University of Hawaii, and the law schools of the
University of Michigan and University of Pennsylvania. He has been a Commissioner of the
Federal Trade Commission, a United States District Court Judge for thirteen years, and is
currently a Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. During his
tenure as a federal district court judge he also served as Vice-Chairman of the Commission for
the Causes and Prevention of Violence established by President Johnson in response to the
assassination of Robert F. Kennedy.
I THE VOICE OF BLACKC AMERICA 974 (P. Foner ed. 1972).
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the institution of legalized slavery two centuries ago? Most of us are victims of
an educational process which distorted in our textbooks the nation's history.
Because of this distortion, so many persons, even those of good will, have not
had the commitment necessary to eradicate the pervasive barriers of racial and
sexual bias with all of their institutional consequences. Most of our leaders have
been oblivious to the magnitude of racial and sexual oppression caused by, sanc-
tioned by, and perpetuated by the early American legal process. Perhaps if we
understand better what an activist force American laws have been in the repres-
sion of blacks and other minorities, many would be more sympathetic to the
efforts made through the legal processes to eradicate the institutional conse-
quences of past repression. For if we understand the magnitude of past legal
oppression maybe we can be more rational and creative in solving the problems
of today.
Many Americans seem quite tired of hearing repeated the sad fact that
racial slavery once existed in this country. They view slavery as some archaeo-
logical incident which has no more relevance to today's problems than the dino-
saur has to supersonic jet travel. Perhaps the penultimate statement is one pur-
portedly made by a Philadelphia public official who, when being questioned
about affirmative action programs, replied that he and his family had never
owned slaves. Yet, some of our most illustrious citizens, those few who for all
time to come will deserve a special reverence by all Americans, have had a dif-
ferent perspective on this issue.
Shortly before Chief Justice Earl Warren died, I spoke with him in great
detail about my fifteen-year research effort on the issue of colonial slavery. He
responded, "I would be especially interested in seeing you at this particular time
because of a reappraisal of my own thinking concerning slavery-not only what
it meant in the past but the danger of what it will still mean to the future."2
What is its legal relevance to the events of today? Many will disregard
George Santayana's warning that "Those who cannot remember the past are
condemned to repeat it." If legal precedent is needed, perhaps the opinions of
four Justices in the Bakke case3 will demonstrate the continuing relevance of
slavery.
At the outset of the opinion of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, they emphasized:
Our Nation was founded on the principle that "all men are created equal."
Yet candor requires acknowledgment that the Framers of our Constitution,
to forge the Thirteen Colonies into one Nation, openly compromised this
principle of equality with its antithesis: slavery. The consequences of this
compromise are well known and have aptly been called our "American
Dilemma."
4
Mr. Justice Marshall stressed the issue of slavery even more pointedly in
the first two paragraphs of his separate opinion:
2 Letter from Earl Warren to A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. (April 25, 1974).
3 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
4 98 S. Ct. at 2767.
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I agree with the judgment of the Court only insofar as it permits a
university to consider the race of an applicant in making admissions deci-
sions. I do not agree that petitioner's admissions program violates the Con-
stitution. For it must be remembered that, during most of the past 200
years, the Constitution as interpreted by this Court did not prohibit the
most ingenious and pervasive forms of discrimination against the Negro.
Now, when a State acts to remedy the effects of that legacy of discrimination,
I cannot believe that this same Constitution stands as a barrier.
Three hundred and fifty years ago, the Negro was dragged to this
country in chains to be sold into slavery. Uprooted from his homeland and
thrust into bondage for forced labor, the slave was deprived of all legal
rights. It was unlawful to teach him to read; he could be sold away from
his family and friends at the whim of his master; and killing or maiming
him was not a crime. The system of slavery brutalized and dehumanized
both master and slave.
5
In his opinion, Mr. Justice Blackmun asserts: "In order to get beyond
racism we must first take account of race.''
II. The Historical Record
A. The Separate Treatment of Negroes
During the argument before the United States Supreme Court in Brown v.
Board of Education,' Thurgood Marshall, then chief counsel for the plaintiffs,
was being peppered with questions as to the original understanding and meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment. At one dramatic moment, he paused and
replied, "Why, of all the multitudinous groups of people in this country [do] you
have to single out Negroes and give them this separate treatment?"
8
Few have attempted to answer the question as to why black people, and
only black people, were subject to such legalized separate treatment in this coun-
try. Certainly there is no evidence to establish that whites could not have picked
cotton, hoed tobacco or planted rice. For, as Eric Williams has so persuasively
stated, "the Mississippi dictum is quite untenable that 'only black men and mules
can face the sun in July.' "' For more than a hundred years whites faced the
sun in Barbados and the white Salzburgers of Georgia insisted that rice culti-
vation was not harmful to them." Thus blacks did not become slaves because
whites were physically unable to handle the agricultural demands of the new
colonies. Blacks became slaves because they were cheaper than white labor and
because those in power were willing to treat blacks differently.
In the process of implementing these economically motivated decisions,
5 98 S. Ct. at 2798.
6 98 S. Ct. at 2808.
7 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8 ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55 at 239 (L. Friedman ed. 1968).
9 E. WILLIAMS, CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY 20 (4th ed. 1966).




blacks were kidnapped, brutalized and forced into slavery. Now upon reflection,
it seems incredible that any group claiming to be civilized would have tolerated
and perpetuated a legal process sanctioning such cruelty. On a mass level, it
started with blacks b-eing subjected to the horrors of the middle passage whereby
millions died from disease and suffocation when being transported from Africa
to the Americas." Slaves were packed in between decks only eighteen inches
high, where on some occasions desperate for air to breathe, "men strangled those
next to them and women drove nails into each other's brains. Many unfortunate
creatures on other occasions took the first opportunity of leaping overboard and
getting rid, in this way, of an intolerable life." 2
What was the justification for these atrocities? Merchants and traders either
did not perceive of blacks as human beings or they did not care about what
happened to black human beings so long as a profit could be made. Perhaps
the most candid statement was given by General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney,
one of South Carolina's most prominent leaders and a delegate to the Constitu-
tional Convention. When applauding the Constitution's assurance of slavery
and urging the South Carolina delegation to ratify the constitution, he said:
I am of the same opinion now as I was two years ago... that, while there
remained one acre of swampland uncleared of South Carolina, I would
raise my voice against restricting the importation of negroes [slavesi. I am
as thoroughly convinced as that gentleman is, that the nature of our climate,
and the flat, swampy situation of our country, obliges us to cultivate our
lands with negroes, and that without them South Carolina would soon be a
desert waste.13
In short, he was asserting that slavery must be perpetuated because of the eco-
nomic advantages it gave to the white masters without regard to its destruction
.of blacks.
B. A Bicentennial Era Perspective
Particularly during this bicentennial era, it is appropriate to assess the inter-
relationship of race and the American legal process. This nation has just cele-
brated its 200th birthday in a most grandiose fashion. Conventions have been
held in almost every town to reaffirm those "self-evident truths," and the oratory
will continue to 1987, the 200th anniversary of the United States Constitution.
As praise is heaped on the great leaders of yesterday, and as some laud 1776 as
the Golden Era of liberty, it is often suggested that if only today's leaders had
the integrity and character of Jefferson, Franklin, John Adams, Washington,
and Madison, today's racial difficulties might be quickly resolved. Few have
had the temerity to contradict this general but misdirected consensus, for it is
11 See J. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 40-45 (4th ed. 1974) ; B. QUARLES, THE
NEGRO IN THE MAKING OF AMERICA 15-33 (rev. ed. 1969); F. TANNENBAUM, SLAVE AND
CITIZEN 16-35 (1946); W. WARD, THE ROYAL NAVY AND THE SLAVERS 403 (1969).
12 TANNENBAUM, supra note 11, at 25 (quoting REV. R. WALSH, 2 NOTICES OF BRAZIL
265 (Boston 1831)).
13 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 254 (M. Farrand ed. 1966)
[hereinafter cited as RECORDS OF CONVENTION].
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bad bicentennial form to refer to the fact that many of America's founding
fathers owned slaves and that most, either directly or indirectly, profited from
the evil institution that enslaved only black human beings. For the runaway
mulatto slave, Sandy, this -advertisement placed in the Virginia Gazette by
Thomas Jefferson was far more significant than his flourish of words in the
Declaration of Independence.
Run away from the subscriber in Albemarle, a Mulatto slave called Sandy,
about 35 years of age, his stature is rather low, inclining to corpulence, and
his complexion light; he is a shoemaker by trade, in which he uses his left
hand principally, can do coarse carpenter's work, and is something of a
horse jockey; he is greatly addicted to drink, and when drunk is insolent
and disorderly, in his conversation he swers much, and his behaviour is
artful and knavish. He took with him a white horse, much scarred with
traces of which it is expected he will endeavour to dispose; he also carried
his shoemaker's tools, and will probably endeavour to get employment that
way. Whoever conveys the said slave to me in Albemarle, shall have 40 s.
reward, if taken up within the county, 4 1. if elsewhere within the colony
and 10 1. if in any other colony, from THOMAS JEFFERSON. 4
The bicentennial drum roll of revolutionary heroes and events, then, sym-
bolizes one thing to white Americans but quite another to blacks. From a pre-
dominantly white perspective, the Declaration of Independence is viewed as
former President Nixon described it, "the greatest achievement in the history
of man. We are the beneficiaries of that achievement."'" But who, until recently,
did the "we" describe? Not black America. Frederick Douglass, a leading aboli-
tionist who was born a slave, described Independence Day in 1852 from the
perspective of blacks and slaves rather than whites and slaveholders:
This Fourth of July is yours, not mine. You may rejoice, I must mourn.
To drag a man in fetters to the grand illuminated temple of liberty, and call
upon him to join you in joyous anthems, were inhuman mockery and sacri-
ligious irony.... I say it with a sad sense of the disparity between us. I
am not included within the pale of this glorious anniversary. . . . The
blessings in which you, this day, rejoice, are not enjoyed in common. The
rich inheritance of justice, liberty, prosperity and independence, bequeathed
by your fathers, is shared by you, not by me. The sunlight that brought light
and healing to you, has brought stripes and death to me.'
6
Likewise, from a predominantly white perspective, the pledges of the Pre-
amble to the Constitution honestly set out the largest principles for which the
new American legal process would strive.
We the people... in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice,...
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves
and our posterity .... 17
14 Virginia Gazette, Sept. 14, 1769.
15 Recorded message of President Richard M. Nixon on July 4, 1970, at the Honor America
Day Celebration in Washington, D.C., 6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 892 (1970).
16 2 THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 189 (P. Foner ed. 1970).
17 U.S. CONST. preamble.
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From a black perspective, however, the Constitution's references to justice, wel-
fare, and liberty were mocked by the treatment meted out daily to blacks from
the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries through judicial decisions, in legislative
enactments, and those provisions of the Constitution that sanctioned slavery for
the majority of black Americans and allowed disparate treatment for those few
blacks legally "free."
Whatever hope there might have been for one day peacefully redefining
"We the people" to include black Americans was closed by the 1857 U. S.
Supreme Court decision Dred Scott v. Sandford."8 When asked if the phrase
"We the people" included black people and whether blacks were embraced in
the egalitarian language of the Declaration of Independence, Chief Justice Roger
Taney, speaking for the majority, wrote: "[A]t the time of the Declaration of
Independence, and when the Constitution of the United States was framed and
adopted. .. [blacks] had no rights which the white man was bound to respect."' 9
Yet, Taney had not really answered the question. Rather, he had gone
back in time in an attempt to determine what the founding fathers had intended,
and in so doing, had argued from the untenable position that the Constitution
might never have any meaning broader than that allowed by the restrictive
vision of eighteenth-century America.
Thus, for black Americans today-the children of all the hundreds of Kunta
Kintes unjustly chained in bondage-the early failure of the nation's founders
to share the legacy of freedom with black Americans is one factor in America's
persistent racial tensions. As late as 1884, twenty years after the Civil War, over
one hundred years after the Declaration of Independence, two hundred fifty
years after the first black man set foot in America, Mark Twain wrote the fol-
lowing passage from Huckleberry Finn, in which he parodied white attitudes,
and suggested that many white Americans still failed to perceive blacks as human
beings.
"Good gracious. Anybody hurt?"
"No'm. Killed a nigger."
"Well, it's lucky because sometimes people do get hurt. .,20
But however tightly woven into the history of their country is the legalization
of black suppression, many Americans still find it too traumatic to study the true
story of racism as it has existed under their "rule of law." For many, the primary
conclusion of the National Commission on Civil Disorders is still too painful
to hear:
What white Americans have never fully understood-but what the Negro
can never forget-is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto.
White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society
condones it.21
Since the language of the law shields one's consciousness from direct involve-
18 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
19 60 U.S. at 407.
20 M. TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 306-07 (1884).
21 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968).
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ment with the stark plight of its victims, the human tragedy of the slavery system
does not surface from the mere reading of cases, statutes, and constitutional pro-
visions. Rather it takes a skeptical reading of most of the early cases and statutes
to avoid having one's surprise and anger dulled by the casualness with which
the legal process dealt with human beings who happened to be slaves. Generally
neither the courts nor the legislatures seemed to have been any more sensitive
about commercial transactions involving slaves than they were about sales of
corn, lumber, horses, or dogs. This casualness is reflected in a perfectly legal
and acceptable advertisement of that era:
One hundred and twenty Negroes for sale-The subscriber has just arrived
from Petersburg, Virginia, with one hundred and twenty likely young
Negroes of both sexes and every description, which he offers for sale on the
most reasonable terms. The lot now on hand consists of ploughboys, several
likely and well-qualified house servants of both sexes, several women and
children, small girls suitable for nurses, and several small boys without their
mothers. Planters and traders are earnestly requested to give the subscriber
a call previously to making purchases elsewhere, as he is enabled to sell as
cheap or cheaper than can be sold by any other person in the trade.
-Hamburg, South Carolina, Benjamin Davis22
The advertisement of Benjamin Davis was not unique; it was typical of
thousands of advertisements posted in newspapers and bulletin boards through-
out our land. In the New Orleans Bee an advertisement noted:
Negroes for sale-a Negro woman, 24 years of age, and her two children,
one eight and the other three years old. Said Negroes will be sold separately
or together, as desired. The woman is a good seamstress. She will be sold
low for cash, or exchange for groceries. For terms apply to Matthew Bliss
and Company, 1 Front Levee.2 3
How could a legal system encourage and sanction such cruelty-cruelty that
permitted the sale, as Benjamin Davis bragged, of "several small boys without
their mothers"? Was there any justice in a legal process that permitted a mother,
twenty-four years of age, to be sold in exchange for groceries and separated from
her children, only eight and three years old? Looking past the commercial
fagade, one sees the advertisement as stating that American laws encouraged
the destruction of black families and the selling of human beings. The only
criterion was the demand of the marketplace.
C. The Voices for Abolition
During these centuries, many did question the morality and legality of
slavery. As early as February, 1688, the Germantown Mennonites and Quakers
of Philadelphia had issued a proclamation against slavery, having found it in-
22 W. GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRAcTICE 54-55 (2d ed.




consistent with Christian principles.24 In 1780, the Pennsylvania legislature
passed "An Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery."2 It was the first legislative
act mandating the ultimate abolition of slavery. In the preamble it was stated:
We find, in the distribution of the human species, that the most fertile as
well as the most barren parts of the earth are inhabited by men of com-
plexions different from ours, and from each other; from whence we may
reasonably, as well as religiously, infer, that He, who placed them in their
various situations, hath extended equally his care and protection to all, and
that it becometh not us to counteract his mercies. We esteem it a peculiar
blessing granted to us, that we are enabled this day to add one more step
to universal civilization, by removing, as much as possible, the sorrows off
those, who have lived in undeserved bondage, and from which, by the
assumed authority of the Kings of Great Britain, no effectual, legal relief
could be obtained.
26
In 1783, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, through an eloquent opinion of
Chief Justice Cushing in the Quock Walker cases,27 declared that
whatever usages formerly prevailed or slid in upon us by the example of
others on the subject, they can no longer exist. Sentiments more favorable
to the natural rights of mankind, and to that innate desire for liberty which
heaven, without regard to complexion or shape, has planted in the human
breast-have prevailed since the glorious struggle for our rights began ...
slavery is in my judgment as effectively abolished as it can be by the granting
of rights and privileges wholly incompatible and repugnant to its existence.
The court are therefore fully of the opinion that perpetual servitude can
no longer be tolerated in our government, and that liberty can only be
forfeited by some criminal conduct or relinquished by personal consent or
contract.2
8
Despite these significant judicial and legislative blows for freedom, the legal
process was generally ineffective in limiting or eliminating slavery where the
economic consequences of emancipation were great. Perhaps Thomas Jefferson
recognized his personal hypocrisy and that of the whole nation when he wrote
on the issue of slavery, "Indeed, I tremble for my country when I reflect that
God is just; that his justice cannot sleep forever."2 "
III. Conclusion
I believe that Mr. Justice Blackmun was right when he said: "In order to
24 See DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 37-38 (H. Commager ed. 1968).
25 Pennsylvania Laws, vol. 1, p. 840, section S.
26 10 Pa. Stat. at L. 67 (March 1, 1780).
27 Quock Walker v. Jennison, Proc. Mass. Hist. Soc. 1873-1875, 296 (September, 1781);
Jennison v. Caldwell, Proc. Mass. Hist. Soc., 1873-1875, 296 (September, 1781); Common-
wealth v. Jennison (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1783). One version of the opinion in this last case appears
in a manuscript notebook in the Harvard University Law Library entitled "Notes of Cases
decided in the Superior and Supreme Judicial Courts of Massachusetts from 1771-1789 taken
by the Honorable Win. Cushing, one of the Judges during that period and most of the time
Chief Justice"; this version first appeared in Cushing, The Cushing Court and the Abolition
of Slavery in Massachusetts: More Notes on the Quock Walker Case, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
(1961).
28 Id. at 132-33.
29 T. JEFFERSON, NoTs ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 156 (1964).
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get beyond racism we must first take account of race."30 And in taking account
of race, we must take account of the lessons of slavery. For American slavery
demonstrates how even distinguished and revered individuals can sanction the
imposition of the most extreme forms of mental and physical cruelty on their
fellow human beings. Today we suffer the consequences of their cruelty decades
and centuries ago.
Of course a comparison of the slavery era with today reveals change and
a recent quarter century of significant progress. Obviously, the racial polarity
and oppression in America is not at the level it was two centuries ago. But we
should not view the last two decades of progress as an era which has been bene-
ficial only to blacks or other racial minorities. In fact, a compelling argument
can be made that, during this century, other groups such as minors, union mem-
bers, business interests and the aged have made relatively greater progress.
From my view there is a real danger today that too many individuals believe
that the battle for equal opportunity for blacks and other minorities has been
won. They seem to be begging civil rights advocates to applaud the nation for
what good has been accomplished and to tone down their rhetoric and demands
for full equality. Thus we may be confronting an era where progress will be
miniscule and retrogression could take place. This same argument, that the battle
has been almost won, was made by some of the delegates at the Constitutional
Convention in 1787. For there, Ellsworth of Connecticut emphasized that slavery
had already been abolished in Masachusetts and urged: "Let us not inter-
meddle.., slavery in time will not be a speck in our country."'" He emphasized
that slavery had already been abolished in Massachusetts and yet that speck of
slavery continued for three quarters of a century and millions of blacks had a
special hell, not imposed on anyone else in American society. If today we accept
the advice of those who claim that the pace should be slackened, that the present
barriers of racial and sexual discrimination will soon not be a speck, we will
doom future generations to cruel injustices. If we slacken the pace or turn back
to the "good old days" there will be a special bitter irony for the sons and
daughters of slaves whose heirs worked centuries in this country without a pay-
check to prevent this nation from, in the words of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney,
"becoming a desert wasteland" 32
For the purposes of this lecture I have focused on the plight of blacks and
slaves. Yet my plea is not only in behalf of those who suffer from the legacy of
slavery. There are millions of Americans both black and white who lack mean-
ingful access to the most important opportunities afforded by this society; what-
ever their sex, race or national origin they are entitled to a more equitable share
of the privileges of this affluent society.
If we recognize how effective and destructive the legal process was in repress-
ing the options of blacks during the slavery and post-Reconstruction era, surely we
must garner the will and the determination to utilize the legal process as effec-
30 98 S. Ct. at 2808.
31 REcoRDs OF CONVENTION, supra note 13, at 370-71.
32 See note 10 supra.
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tively to reverse this destruction and to narrow the gap between black and white
and between rich and poor. There is no more relevant message to convey in
closing than that expressed by Chief Justice Warren in concluding the first Notre
Dame Civil Rights Lecture:
But the vast majority of our people must realize that racial equality under
law is basic to our institutions, and we cannot and will not have tranquility
in our Nation until the race issue is properly settled. We have, it bears
repeating, 34 million members of minority groups whose racial rights have
not been but must be fully accorded. That calls for a combination of effec-
tive law and good will. In the absence of either of these elements, we can
only expect chaos. If there is one lesson to be learned from our tragic expe-
rience in the Civil War and its wake, it is that the question of racial dis-
crimination is never settled until it is settled right. It is not yet rightly
settled.3
33 E. WARREN, Notre Dame Law School Civil Rights Lectures, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 14,
48 (1972).
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